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ABSTRACT 
This paper extends the Barro (1990) model with single aggregate government spending and one 
flat income tax to include public expenditures and taxes by multiple levels of government. It derives 
the rate of endogenous growth and, with both simulations and special examples, examines how that 
rate changes with respect to federal income tax, local taxes, and federal transfers. It also discusses the 
growth and welfare-maximizing choices of taxes and federal transfers. 
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1. Introduction 
In an endogenous growth model, Barro (1990) has examined the effects on 
economic growth of aggregate government spending, including both aggregate public 
consumption and aggregate public investment. Subsequent work has extended Barro's 
analysis by looking into the composition of government expenditures and economic 
growth. For example, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou 
(1998) have studied the growth effects of public spending on education, transportation, 
defense, and social welfare. Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Hulten (1994), and 
Devarajan, Xie, and Zou (1998), among many others, have paid particular attention to the 
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3 
However, the structure of public expenditures and taxes among different levels of 
government has a fundamental impact on economic growth in light of the arguments 
related to fiscal federalism; see Oates (1972, 1973). In fact, the proper assignment of 
expenditures and taxes among federal and local governments and the proper design of 
intergovernmental transfers are prerequisites for efficient and equitable public service 
provision at both the national and local levels. One of the most important goals in 
establishing a sound intergovernmental fiscal relationship is to promote both local and 
national economic growth (see also Rivlin 1992, Bird 1993, Gramlich 1993, and Oates 
1973). 
In view of the important link between the design of intergovernmental fiscal 
relationships and economic growth, it is natural for us to extend the Barro model and 
provide an analytical framework for both theoretical and empirical research on the 
growth effects of public expenditures, taxes, and federal transfers in a federation or in 
multiple levels of government. This is the main task of our paper. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends the Barro 
model with one aggregate government spending and one flat income tax to include: (1) 
public expenditures by both the federal government and local governments; (2) various 
taxes by both the federal government and local governments; and (3) a federal transfer to 
a locality
4. Section 3 derives the rate of endogenous growth. With both simulations and 
special examples, section 4 examines the change in the rate of endogenous growth with 
respect to federal income tax, local income tax, and federal transfers. Section 5 derives 
the optimal federal government income tax rate, local government income tax rate, and 
the federal matching transfer for the locality. Section 6 presents a more general model 
with local government consumption tax and property tax. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
Following Arrow and Kurz (1970), Barro (1990), and Turnovsky (2000), we 
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of only on local spending; third, federal taxation, federal transfer, and federal spending are fully integrated into the introduce public expenditures by the federal government and local governments into the 
representative agent's utility function and production function. Federal spending is 
denoted by  f , local public spending by s , and private consumption by c . The 
instantaneous utility of the representative agent is given by  (, ,) ucf s, which has the 
following properties: 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0. cfsc cf fs s uuuu u u                  ( 1 )  
To derive analytical solution for the endogenous growth rate, we extend the utility 
function of Barro (1990) as follows 
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where  0     is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
The representative agent seeks to maximize a discounted utility, as given by 
0 (, ,) ,
t Uu c f s e d t
                                  ( 3 )  
where  01     is the constant rate of time preference. 
The agent has access to the extended Arrow-Kurz-Barro neoclassical production 
function 
(, ,) , yy k f s                                 ( 4 )  
where  y   is output and  k   is private capital stock. 
The role of government services in both the utility function and the production 
function was introduced to dynamic analysis of public investment and growth by Arrow 
and Kurz (1970). The approach to endogenous growth models was popularized by Barro 
(1990). In recent studies on fiscal decentralization and growth, the Arrow-Kurz-Barro 
approach to preferences and technology has been extended to different public 
expenditures by multiple levels of government; see Brueckner (1996), Davoodi and Zou 
(1998), and Zhang and Zou (1998) for examples. Again, the production function is 
assumed to have the following standard properties: 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0. kfs k kf f s s yyyy yy    
In this paper, the production function takes the CES form, 
1
() , yk fs
                           ( 5 )  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
model; and finally, we examine growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing choices of taxes and transfers. where   ,   ,   , and     are positive constants with  1.      
The federal government levies an income tax at the rate of  f  , and a typical local 
government levies a local income tax
5 (as in the case of state income tax in the United 
States) at the rate of  s  . The federal government also makes a transfer to the local 
government in the form of a matching grant for local public spending at the rate of  g . If 
both levels of government maintain balanced budgets, then their budget constraints can 
be written as 
f f yg s                                 ( 6 )  
and 
, s s yg s                                ( 7 )  
respectively. Hence, federal public spending,  f , equals total income tax,  f y  , minus the 
transfer to the local government,  gs . Local government spending is financed by its 
income tax,  sy    and the grant it receives from the federal government,  gs . 
Given the tax rates of the two levels of government, the budget constraint of the 
representative agent can be written as 
(1 ) ( , , ) . fs
dk
yk f s k c
dt
                            ( 8 )  
The representative agent chooses a consumption path and a capital-accumulation 
path to maximize his discounted utility in equation (3) subject to constraint (8), and with 
his initial capital stock given by  0 (0) kk  . 
The Hamiltonian associated with the optimization problem is defined as   
(, ,) ( ( 1 )(, ,) ) , fs H u cfs y kfs k c          
where     is the costate variable, and it represents the marginal utility of wealth. 
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and the transversality condition (TVC) is 
                                                             





                            ( 1 1 )  
Specifically, for the utility function in equation (2) and the production function in 
equation (5), we rewrite equations (9) and (10) as follows: 
c
 
                                  ( 1 2 )  
and 
1 1 1 1
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                 ( 1 3 )  
Equation (12) states that the marginal utility of wealth equals the marginal utility of 
consumption at an optimum. Equation (13) is the familiar Euler equation for consumption 
with multiple government services and tax rates. 
 
3. The Balanced Growth Rate 
Suppose that the economy is on the balanced growth path where private 
consumption, private capital, federal government expenditure, local government 
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Substituting condition (14) into equations (8) and (13), we obtain   
1 1 1
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and 
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From equation (15), we have   
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Substituting equation (17) into equation (16), we derive the consumption-capital 
ratio as   
1
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On the other hand, from government budget constraints (6) and (7), and combining 
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and 
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Substituting equation (21) into equation (17) yields the explicit solution for the 
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Equation (22) states that the growth rate is an explicit function of  f  ,  s  ,  g ,   , 
 ,   ,   ,   , and   . 
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                    ( 2 4 )  
Equations (23) and (24) present the condition for endogenous growth. 
Now, the optimal growth paths for capital accumulation,  () kt, consumption,  () ct , 
federal government spending,  () f t , local government spending,  () s t , and output,  () yt   
are derived as follows 
() ( 0 ) , () ( 0 ) , () ( 0 ) , () ( 0 ) , () ( 0 ) ,
tt tt t kt k e ct c e ft f e st s e yt y e
           ( 2 5 )  
where the initial capital stock  (0) k  is given, but the initial federal spending  (0) f , local 
government spending  (0) s , initial consumption  (0) c , and initial output  (0) y , will de determined by the model. 
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and 
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Now, from equation (5), we have 
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                        ( 2 8 )  
With  (0) y  given in equation (28),  (0) f   and  (0) s  can be determined by 
equations (26) and (27), respectively;  (0) c   can be determined by the budget constraint of 
the agent: 
(0) (1 ) (0) ( ) (0). fs cy k                         ( 2 9 )  
With the aid of explicit solutions for the growth rate, we can analyze the effects on 
growth of the federal government's income tax, the local government's income tax, and 
the federal government's matching transfer. Using the explicit paths of the capital 
accumulation, consumption, and government's spending, we can derive the social welfare 
function, and then we can derive the optimal tax rate and government transfer to 
maximize the social welfare. We will process these in the next section. 
 
4. Effects of Taxes and Federal Transfers 
Differentiating equation (22) with respect to the federal government income tax rate, 
f  , local government's income tax rate,  s  , and the federal matching grant for locality, 







(1 )(1 ) ( ) 1
[]










   
     





   

  






[( ) ( ) ] 1 1




f fs g g g
gg





   
    
















[( ) ( ) ] 1




















.                     ( 3 2 )  
Equations (30), (31), and (32) state the ambiguous effects on growth of the federal 
government income tax rate,  f  , local government's income tax rate,  s  , and the federal 
matching grant for locality,  g . For the intuition, we present some numerical solutions. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the rate of endogenous growth,   , and the 
federal government's income tax rate,  f  , when the following base values are used for 
the structure of local government taxation and federal transfer: a local income tax at 10 
percent:  0.10 s   , and a federal matching grant at 50 percent:  0.5 g  . We assume the 
following values for preference and technology parameters:  0.5   ,  0.05   ,  0.05   ,  
2   , and  0.4   . For the parameters of   and  , which represent the marginal 
productivity of federal government spending and local government spending, respectively, 
we consider three cases:  0.25    ;  0.35, 0.15;      and  0.15, 0.35     . In all 
three cases, Figure 1 presents typical Laffer curves relating the growth rate to federal 
income tax. In the case of equal marginal productivity of federal government expenditure 
and local government expenditure, given local tax, federal transfer, and all other 
parameters in our model, a rise in federal income tax will increase the growth rate before 
the tax rate hits around 13 percent. In fact, when the federal income tax rate rises from 
zero to 10 percent, the growth rate rises from zero percent to almost 4.4 percent. Further 
increases in the federal income tax rate above 13 percent will reduce the growth rate. Just 
before the federal income tax rate reaches a high of 60 percent (note that the local income 
tax rate is assumed to be 10 percent), the growth rate is around zero. 
    The explanation for this Laffer curve is as follows. A change in federal income tax 
has three effects. First, a higher federal income tax directly reduces the return on private 
capital and the growth rate directly. Second, a larger tax revenue implies higher federal expenditure, which is assumed to increase both private utility and private productivity. 
The rising productivity of private capital raises the growth rate. Third, at the same time, a 
larger tax revenue can lead to a larger federal transfer to local government, whose public 
services are also utility- and productivity-enhancing. When the federal income tax rate is 
initially very small, the second and third forces dominate. When the federal income tax is 
already high, the first force dominates. 
        For the effects of federal government expenditure and local government expenditure, 
we find that as the marginal productivity of local government expenditure increases, the 
growth rate decreases before the critical point of federal government income tax rate 
0.30 f   . The critical point of that rate, which reaches the maximum growth rate, 
decreases. In fact, from equation (22), we have   
1
1
(1 ) (( ) ( )
11 11
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Thus, when  01   ， we  have 
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  . This is shown in Figure 1. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here.) 
        Figure 2 shows a similar picture of the relationship between the growth rate,   , and 
local income tax rate,  s   using the following base values for the structure of federal 
income tax, local taxes other than local income tax, and federal transfer: a federal income 
tax at 20 percent:  0.20 f   , and a federal matching grant at 50 percent:  0.5 g  . We also 
assume the following values for preference and technology parameters:  0.5   ,  0.05   , 
0.05   ,  2   , and  0.4   ; and consider three cases:  0.25     ;  0.35   ,  0.15   ; 
and  0.15   ,  0.35   . We find Laffer curves similar to those in Figure 1. 
For the equal marginal productivity of federal and local government expenditure, as 
the base federal income tax is already at a relatively high rate of 20 percent, the growth rate is rising with local income tax until  s   reaches about 5 percent. When the local 
income tax rate is set at 20 percent, the growth rate is zero. Because the local government 
receives a matching grant from the federal government at a rate of 30 percent, and 
because it also raises tax revenues from consumption tax and property tax, the local 
government can still finance its productive public expenditures without resorting to 
income tax. This is why the growth rate in Figure 2 is still above 3 percent even though 
local income tax is zero. 
We present similar effects of federal government expenditure and local government 









. We find that as the marginal productivity of 
local government expenditure increases, the growth rate decreases before the critical 
point of the government income tax rate  0.0667 s   . The critical point of local 
government income tax rate, which reaches the maximal growth rate, decreases. 
(Insert Figure 3 about here.) 
Figure 3 relates the growth rate,   , to the federal matching grant for locality,  g , 
based on a federal income tax of 20 percent and a local income tax at 10 percent. Again, 
we assume the following values for preference and technology parameters:  0.5   , 
0.05   ,  0.05   ,  2   , and  0.4   ; and consider three cases:  0.25     ;  0.35   , 
0.15   ; and  0.15   ,  0.35   . 
We obtain three different effects on growth of a federal matching grant for the local 
government: when the marginal productivity of federal government spending is larger 
than the marginal productivity local government spending, i.e.    , the federal 
government matching transfer will decrease the growth rate. When the two government 
have the same marginal productivity, there is a non-evidence effect of the matching 
transfer on growth before  0.5 g  . When local government expenditure has relatively 
larger marginal productivity, we find the contrasting solution whereby as the federal 
matching transfer increases, the growth rate increases before  0.6 g  .  
We find that the effects of a federal matching transfer on growth can be negative 
when it is too large (say,  0.6 g  ).  We have selected the tax base for the local 
government income tax rate as  0.1 s   , and thus the local government has already obtained an amount of revenue from its income tax. If the matching transfer is too high, 
then the federal government should pay for the major part of local government 
expenditure, and the local government's income tax will be in surplus. This will harm 
economic growth. 
Similarly, we can show the effects of the marginal productivity of local government 












when  g g
  , the effect of local government expenditure on growth is negative; when, 
g g
  , the effect is positive. 
 
5. Optimal Taxes and Transfers 
5.1 Growth Maximization and Welfare Maximization 
In the last section, we numerically presented the relationships among  f  ,  s  ,  g , 
and the growth. Recall that Barro (1990) shows that maximizing social welfare is 
equivalent to maximizing the rate of growth, and the optimal tax rate equals the marginal 
contribution of government expenditure. To compare our solutions with that of Barro 
(1990), we reexamine the conclusions we have drawn by using the special production 
function. In this section, we specify the production function as the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, which amounts to set  0    in the CES production function, 
namely, 
yk f s
   ,                         ( 3 4 )  
where   ,   , and     are positive constants with  1    . 
Hence, the explicit balanced growth rate expressed in equation (22) has the 
following form, 
1
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On the other hand, if we substitute the growth paths (25) for consumption, federal 
spending, and local government spending into the utility function in (2), the agent's 
welfare is given as 1( 1 ) 1( 1 ) 1( 1 )
0
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where we have used the TVC (11) to obtain  (1 ) 0     . 
Here,  (0) f  and  (0) s  are still determined by equations (26) and (27).  (0) y  is 
determined by substituting equations (26) and (27) into equation (34), i.e,   











.                        ( 3 7 )  
Then,  (0) c   can be determined by equation (29). 
(Insert Figure 4 about here!) 
It is simple to see that in equation (36) the agent's welfare is an increasing function 
of the economic growth rate
6,   . However
7, because  (0) c ,  (0) f , and  (0) s  also depend 
on  f  ,  s  , and  g , welfare maximization may not be equivalent to growth maximization. 
This is shown in Figure 4, where we select the parameters as:  0.5   ,  0.35   ,  0.15   , 
0.05   ,  0.05   ,  1.1   ,  0.5 g  , and  0.05 s   . We find that the optimal federal 
income tax rate, which maximizes growth is around  0.4. However, the optimal federal 
income tax rate, which reaches the maximum welfare, is around  0.5. Therefore, growth- 
and the welfare-maximizing taxes are not equivalent in this case. 
5.2 The Growth-maximizing Taxes 
We now focus on finding the optimal taxes for growth maximization. In fact, 
differentiating equation (35) with respect to  f  ,  s  , and  g  yields 
1 1
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6In fact, differentiating on equation (36) with respect to    yields 
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and 
1 11
(1 ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] 0.
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Thus, we have 
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Equation (40') yields the same expression as equations (38') and (39'). Hence, we 
know that optimal choices of  f  ,  s  , and  g  are interdependent. The choice of the 
federal matching grant is endogenous in the following sense: once  g   is chosen from the 
interval  (0,1), federal income tax and local income tax are determined by (38') and (39'). 
From equations (38') and (39'), we obtain the optimal tax rates as
8 
f g                              ( 4 1 )  
and 
s g     ,                          ( 4 2 )  
for the federal government and local government, respectively. 
Once  g  is given in the interval (0,1), the federal and local income taxes are 
determined by their productiveness and the matching rate multiplied by the productivity 
of local public spending. The aggregate optimal tax rate is just the sum of the 
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. 
It is easy to prove that this matrix is negative definite. Therefore, the second-order conditions are satisfied. productiveness of federal and local expenditures: 
sf     .                             ( 4 3 )  
With the choices of tax rates and transfer specified in equations (41) and (42), the 
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We should say something about the effects of optimal government matching transfer 
and effects of the matching transfer on the growth. In the last section, we showed the 
government matching transfer can affect growth but the optimal choices of government 
matching transfer and the tax rates are interdependent. This occurs because, from 
equations (6) and (7), we have 
() sf f sy     . 
The government transfer becomes an independent variable. We can also derive the 
equation with only the federal government income tax rate and government matching 
transfer; thus, the local government income tax rate becomes an independent variable. 
The effects of government matching transfer in the last section are based on the 
selected federal and local income tax rates. Thus, we obtain the effects shown in Figure 3. 
In addition, given the local income tax rate, from equations (38') and (40') we can 
determine the optimal choices for the government matching transfer and federal income 
tax rate. 
 
6. A More General Framework 
We can extend our analytical framework to a more general one and consider more 
tax rates. The same set up is used for the federal government but we introduce two more 
taxes for the typical local government. It now levies three taxes: a local income tax (such 
as the case of state income tax in the United States) at the rate of  s  , a consumption tax 
c    and a property tax (capital tax in our model)  k  . The federal government also makes a 
transfer to the local government in the form of a matching grant for local public spending 
at the rate of  g . If both levels of government maintain balanced budgets, then budget 
constraints (6) and (7) can be written as 
f f yg s                                    ( 4 4 )  and 
skc s ykc g s     ,                          ( 4 5 )  
respectively. 
Hence, the federal government public spending,  f , is equal to its total income tax, 
f y  , minus its transfer to the local government,  gs . The local government's spending is 
financed by its income tax,  sy  , its property tax,  kk  , its consumption tax,  cc  , and the 
grant it receives from the federal government,  gs . 
In a similar way, we derive a highly nonlinear equation for the growth rate   :  
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Note that   appears on both sides of equation (46). Therefore, the growth rate is 
implicitly defined as a function of  f  ,  s  ,  k  ,  c  ,  g ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   , and   . 
For the endogenous growth rate to be positive, we must impose  0   , and from the 
TVC  
(1 ) 0     , 
which is also the condition for a bounded discounted utility over the infinite horizon. 
Given such an extended framework with government expenditures and taxes by two 
levels of government and intergovernmental transfer, we cannot hope that 
growth-maximizing choices of tax rates and the transfer rate will be consistent with the 
welfare-maximizing ones. The simple case in Barro's (1990) analysis whereby growth 
maximization coincides with welfare maximization disappears here. In fact, when both a 
local consumption tax and a local property tax are present, welfare is a complicated 
function of the growth rate, which in turn is a complicated function of various taxes and the federal transfer, as shown in equation (46). 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has extended the Barro (1990) model with single aggregate government 
spending and one flat income tax to include public expenditures and taxes by multiple 
levels of government. We have derived the rate of endogenous growth under quite 
general specifications of preferences and production technology. With simulations, we 
have examined how the rate of endogenous growth changes with respect to federal 
income tax, local income tax, and federal transfer. We have also discussed 
growth-maximizing choices of income taxes and federal transfer. In addition, we extend 
our model to a more general framework including a local consumption tax and local 
property tax. A preliminary simulation analysis has shown that the local property tax has 
the largest negative impact on the rate of economic growth, whereas a local consumption 
tax is always growth enhancing. This finding contrasts with that of Rebelo (1991), who 
shows that a consumption tax has no effect on the growth rate. 
The model in this paper sets up a positive framework for evaluating how the 
assignment of taxes and expenditures among different levels of government and 
intergovernmental transfers affect economic growth. Our analysis also sheds light on the 
role of intergovernmental transfers in regional economic growth. If a local government 
has sufficient revenue base, federal transfers seem to reduce the growth rate. Even if local 
revenue is not sufficient, the rise in the rate of federal transfer increases the growth rate to 
a very modest degree. Of course, the model is also useful for normative discussions of the 
welfare- and growth-maximizing choices of taxes, transfers, and expenditures in the 
context of fiscal federalism. 
In future, we will add two more dimensions: one will be to follow Arrow and Kurz 
(1970) and introduce public consumption and public capital accumulation at both the 
federal and local levels into the endogenous growth model; the other will be to formulate 
a game-theoretical growth model and allow strategic interactions between the federal 
government and multiple local governments in the choices of taxes, public expenditures, 
and intergovernmental transfers. 
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Figure 1: Growth rate versus federal government income tax rate. The parameters 
are:  0.5   ,  0.4   ,  0.05   ,  0.05   ,  2   ,  0.5 g  , and  0.1 s   ; in the case of 
   :  0.35   ,  0.15   ;     :  0.25   ,  0.25   ;     :  0.15   , 0.35   . 
 
 
          
Figure 2: Growth rate versus local government income tax rate. The parameters are: 
0.5   ,  0.4   ,  0.05   ,  0.05   ,  2   ,  0.5 g  , and  0.2 f   ; in the case of    : 
0.35   ,  0.15   ;     :  0.25   ,  0.25   ;     :  0.15   , 0.35     
 
 
Figure 3: Growth rate versus federal government matching grant for locality  g . The 
parameters are:  0.5   ,  0.4   ,  0.05   ,  0.05   ,  2   ,  0.2 f   , and  0.1 s   ; in the 
case of     :  0.35   ,  0.15   ;     :  0.25   ,  0.25   ;     :  0.15   , 0.35    
  
 
Figure 4: Growth maximization and welfare maximization. The parameters are: 
0.5   ,  0.35   ,  0.15   ,  0.05   ,  0.05   ,  1.1   ,  0.5 g  , and  0.05 s   . 
 